| 摘要: |
| 在有政府参与情况下，针对由制造商和零售商组成的两级闭环供应链，建立了由制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型，得出了不同政策对产品的批发价、零售价、产品的回收率、碳排放总量及供应链利润的影响，并用数值算例进行了验证。结果表明：当碳交易价格与政府补贴力度满足一定条件时，在碳交易与补贴结合政策下，会使得零售价降低、回收率提高、需求量增加、供应链总利润大幅提高，同时碳排放量也有较大幅度的下降。因此同时实行碳交易与政府补贴政策可以弥补单独实行两种政策的不足，有效的降低碳排放量、提高供应链的整体利润，从而使得再制造闭环供应链达到较优状态。 |
| 关键词: 再制造 碳交易政策 政府补贴 Stackelberg博弈 |
| DOI：10.11933/j.issn.1007-9289.20170704001 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家重点研发计划项目（2017YFF0207905） |
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| Effects of Carbon Trading and Subsidy Policy on Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain |
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ZHANG Hai-mi1, LIU Bo-hai1, LI En-zhong2, ZHANG Di1, ZHOU Xin-yuan2
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1.Management School, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009;2.National Key Laboratory for Remanufacturing, Army Academy of Armored Force, Beijing 100072
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| Abstract: |
| Considering the involvement of the government, a Stackelberg game model led by a manufacturer was developed, according to two levels of closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The impacts of different policies on product wholesale, retail, product recovery, carbon emissions and supply chain profit were observed and verified by a numerical example. The results show that, when the price of carbon trading and government subsidies satisfy certain conditions, the combination of carbon trading and subsidy policy can reduce the retail price, increase the recovery rate and the demand, significantly improve the total profit of the supply chain, and significantly decrease the carbon emissions. Therefore, the implementation of carbon trading and government subsidy policy can make up for the deficiencies of separating the two policies, reduce carbon emissions and improve the overall profit of the supply chain, making the remanufacturing closed loop supply chain achieve a better condition. |
| Key words: remanufacturing carbon trading policy government subsidy Stackelberg game |
